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NOTES
BANK CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT:
NOTES NOT IN TUNE WITH
SECURITIES REGULATION
I. Introduction
The United States banking industry, suffering from a steady out-
flow of bank deposits,' introduced the twenty-six week high-yield
time deposit to the public in 1978.2 Commercial banks and savings
1. See Hyatt, Certificate Linked to Treasury Bill Rates is Planned by U.S. to Boost
Savings Flow, Wall St. J., May 11, 1978, at 6, col. 2; Wall St. J., May 12, 1978, at 3,
col. 2. See also Savings Banks Lose Heavily, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at D1, col. 1.
The outflow of dollars from commercial banks and savings and loan associations was
due in large part to the "rapid rise in money market rates relative to deposit rate
ceilings .... 43 Fed. Reg. 21437 (1978).
2. 43 Fed. Reg. 21435-39 (1978). The six-month time deposit was created "in
order to increase returns for savers by providing [a] deposit categor[y] that [is]
competitive with interest rates available in the market on instruments possessing
similar characteristics." Id. at 21436. A primary concern of the banking bodies was
to "increase the flow of mortgage credit and assist the housing market." Id. Evi-
denced by and popularly known today as "six-month certificates of deposit," this new
category of time deposit was authorized simultaneously by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id. at 21435-39. The savings
certificate is non-negotiable and earns a fixed rate of interest during its twenty-six
week life, a rate comparable to the prevailing six-month Treasury bill at commercial
banks and 1/4% higher at savings institutions. Id. at 21437; 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.7,
329.6(c), 329.7(6)(7) (1981).
In 1980, Congress enacted the Depositary Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980,
Act of March 31, 1980, 94 Stat. 142, Pub. L. No. 96-221. The purpose of the act is to
phase out the interest rate ceilings which limit the interest paid on accounts in
depositary institutions because such limitations "discouraged persons from saving
money, create[d] inequities for depositors, impede[d] the ability of depositary institu-
tions to compete for funds, and [did not provide] an even flow of funds for home
mortgage lending." Id. § 202(a). The act transferred the authority conferred by §
190) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1976 & Supp. III 1979), § 18(g) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and
§ 5B(a) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1425b(a) (1976), to
prescribe rules governing the payment of interest and dividends and the establish-
ment of classes of deposits or accounts to the Depositary Deregulation Committee.
Id. § 203(a). See also REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS ON H.R. 4986, S. REP. No. 368 (1979), in which the Inter-Agency Task Force
on Deposit Interest Rate Controls and Housing Credit recommended the phase out of
deposit interest rate ceilings.
As of June 1978, standard six-month savings certificates had a 5.75% ceiling
interest rate at savings banks and a 5.5 % ceiling at commercial banks. By compari-
470 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X
and loan associations have been advertising this high-yield deposit
aggressively-at times touting the savings certificates which evidence
the deposit as "investments" and characterizing depositors as "inves-
tors."' 3 Widespread acceptance 4 of savings instruments has produced
litigation in the federal courts concerning the rights and liabilities of
the issuer and holder of such notes.5 For example, the Supreme Court
currently is faced with the question of whether a certificate of deposit 6
son, as of May 1978, six-month Treasury bills had an average return of 6.986%.
Hyatt, Certificate Linked to Treasury Bill Rates is Planned by U.S. to Boost Savings
Flow, Wall St. J., May 11, 1978, at 6, col. 2.
3. For example, one newspaper advertisement asserts, "With a ...CD [certifi-
cate of deposit], your future can be a lot more predictable than the economy's." N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1982, at A9 (advertisement). The advertisement copy explains,
"[t]his is how it works: we simply give you a bookkeeping loan against a 30 month
certificate, but it's not a loan in the usual sense. . . . At maturity, your 'investment'
and your 'loan' simply cancel each other out automatically." Id. "For example, if you
deposit $40,000 you'll earn $200 extra [interest than for any current six-month CD];
with an $80,000 investment you'll earn an extra $6001 ... On top of that, your
investment is FDIC insured." Id.
4. The introduction of the certificates has been successful-banks issued some $9.5
billion of the new instruments during the first 30 days of availability. A Fresh Tool
for Savings Catches On, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 28, 1978, at 72, col. 1.
Moreover, in the period of 1970-1980, individual savings deposits in the nation's
banks decreased 29.3%; by contrast, high-yield time deposits (including 6- and 30-
month money-market certificates), 'increased a staggering 147.4%. Scharff, The
Savings Revolution, Time, June 8, 1981, at 58, col. 1. In 1980, 189 of the top 200
banks in the nation (as determined by the amount of assets held) contained more time
deposits than demand deposits in their vaults. Bank Scoreboard, Bus. WK., April 13,
1981, at 88, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (Feb. 23, 1982); Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.
1980), argued, 50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 11, 1982); Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1980); Adato v. Kagan,
599 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1979); Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d
1262, (4th Cir.), vacated as moot, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 826 (1977); Safeway Portland Employee's Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner & Co.,
501 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109
(5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. First Am. Bank and Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973);
Ayala v. Jamaica Sav. Bank, FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 98041 (E.D.N.Y. June 1,
1981); Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304
(D.N.H. 1980); Hamblett v. Board of Sav. and Loan Assoc., 472 F. Supp. 158 (N.D.
Miss. 1979); Hendrickson v. Buchbinder, 465 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Dro-
vers Bank of Chicago v. SFC Corp., 452 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Garner v.
Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp.
490 (D. Utah 1973); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 300 F.
Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), ajf'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
6. As defined in federal regulations,
[t]he term "time certificate of deposit" means a deposit evidenced by a
negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument which provides on its face that the
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
issued to a time depositor by a bank falls within the statutory meaning
of "security" 7 as defined by federal securities laws.8 In Marine Bank
amount of such deposit is payable to bearer or to any specified person or to
his order:
(1) On a certain date, specified in the instrument, not less than 30 days
after the date of the deposit, or
(2) At the expiration of a certain specified time not less than 30 days
after the date of the instrument, or
(3) Upon notice in writing which is actually required to be given not
less than 30 days before the date of repayment, and,
(4) In all cases only upon presentation and surrender of the instrument.
12 C.F.R. § 217.1(c) (1981).
A certificate of deposit is a receipt for the deposit of funds in a bank of
which there are two classes, demand and time. Demand certificates of
deposit are payable on demand, and time certificates of deposit are pay-
able on a specified date, or so many days after date, upon proper indorse-
ment. These time certificates are similar to savings deposits, but have a
definite maturity, and are evidenced by a certificate instead of a passbook
entry. Time certificates of deposit may bear interest, and are, therefore, a
convenient means of investing temporarily idle funds, which otherwise
would be unemployed.
G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING OF FINANCE 178-79 (F.L. Garcia rev. ed.
1973). See also note 16 infra.
7. The definition of "security" in the 1933 Act is as follows:
When used in this subehapter, unless the context otherwise requires,-
[t]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1976). The definition of "security" in the 1934 Act is as follows:
When used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires
• ..[t]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known
as a "security;" or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1976).
8. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976
and Supp. III 1979); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
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v. Weaver," the plaintiffs alleged that a certificate of deposit which
they pledged as a guaranty for a loan made to a financially unstable
business was a security. 10 Inclusion of certificates of deposit within
the statutory definition"I of security would result in the application of
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 193312 (1933 Act) and
9. 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), argued, 50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 11, 1982).
10. In Weaver, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant Marine Bank issued a
certificate of deposit to them and, in doing so, violated the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act. 637 F.2d at 159. To secure a guaranty on a loan made to a meat packing
company, the plaintiffs pledged the $50,000 certificate of deposit to the bank. Id. at
161. The plaintiffs alleged that the bank characterized their pledge as involving little
risk because the value of the collateral was substantial enough to protect both them
and Marine Bank. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157
(3d Cir. 1980). When the loan eventually became due, the bank claimed that the
collateral was inadequate and asserted that it intended to resort to the certificate. 637
F.2d at 159.
11. Two statutory definitions of "security" that ostensibly apply to modern high-
yield certificates of deposit do not: (1) "certificate of deposit, for a security," and
(2) "any note ... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months ...... See note 7 supra. "Certificate of deposit, for a security" refers to
instruments issued by security holders' protective committees in the course of corpo-
rate reorganizations. Courts do not construe this term to include a certificate of
deposit issued in exchange for currency. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust
Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 1980); Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v.
MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262, vacated as moot, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aJf'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Section 3(a)(10) in referring to a "certificate of
deposit, for a security," can further be construed to imply the negative; that is, a
certificate of deposit issued for currency is excluded. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus, 537
F.2d at 1265.
Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), exempts from the statute's
registration provisions those notes which have a maturity not exceeding nine months.
This does not affect time deposit savings certificates with maturities less than nine
months as "section 3(a)(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable [commercial]
paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper used to
facilitate well recognized types of current operational business requirements and of a
type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks." Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974), quoting SEC Release No. 4412; 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1961);
17 C.F.R. 231.4412 (1961).
12. Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
[Vol. X
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the Securities Exchange Act of 193413 (1934 Act) to time deposit
savings certificates issued by the banking industry. Such statutory
construction would provide a federal forum 14 and potential remedies
for prospective plaintiffs above and beyond the provisions already
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C.. § 77Q(a) (1976).
13. Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See generally L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1421-1519
(2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
SEC Rule lOb-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
14. "The relative ease with which one may recover for a violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 has led prospective plaintiffs to seek redress in federal forums even though their
claims do not involve instruments which fall within the everyday conception of
securities." Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV.
478, 478-79 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A Note]. The existence of a private cause of
action for violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the regulation that implements the 1934
Act's antifraud provision, is well established by case law. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); A Note, supra at 479 n.2. The existence of a
private right of action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, however, has not been acknowl-
edged universally. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,
557 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
Some circuits have supported a private right of action under § 17(a). Stephenson v.
Calpini Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (private right exists in
light of "minimal differences" between § 17(a) of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the
1934 Act); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (private right
under § 17(a) exists once it is established that plaintiff has an action under § 10(b) of
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existing in the federal banking laws.15 The Securities and Exchange
Commission, under whose scrutiny savings certificates would fall
should the instruments be deemed securities, supports a broad statu-
tory interpretation including the item as a security. 6 By contrast, the
banking lobby has taken the position that "Congress intended to
protect bank depositors by means of the banking laws"17 and that
application of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts would be
tantamount to "regulatory overkill."' 8
the 1934 Act); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245-46
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 507 (1979)). See also Engl v. Berg,
511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981). But see State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail,
Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 689 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is considerable
doubt as to whether a private right of action exists under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act.");
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d 342,
350 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court declined to decide whether a private right of action
under § 17(a) existed). The Eighth Circuit has denied such a right of action. Shull v.
Dain, Kaiman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978). See also Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Hardy v.
Samson, 356 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Bank & Trust Co., 336
F. Supp. 1980 (D. Me. 1971).
15. The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board are
required to maintain a separate division of consumer affairs to receive complaints
and take appropriate action to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices by banks
or savings and loan institutions, where such acts affect commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). In addition, Federal Reserve regulations contain the follow-
ing provision concerning advertising of interest on deposits:
Every advertisement, or solicitation relating to the interest paid on de-
posits in member banks shall be governed by the following rules:
(g) Accuracy of Advertising. No member bank shall make any advertise-
ments, announcement, or solicitation relating to the interest paid on de-
posits that is inaccurate or misleading or that misrepresents its deposit
contracts.
(h) Solicitation of deposits for banks. Any person or organization that
solicits deposits for a member bank shall be bound by the rules contained
in this section with respect to any advertisement, announcement, or solici-
tation relating to such deposits.
12 C.F.R. § 217.6 (1981). Similarly, regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation provide: "Accuracy of Advertisements. No insured nonmember bank
shall make any advertisement, announcement, or solicitation relating to the interest
or dividends paid on deposits which is inaccurate or misleading or which misrepre-
sents its deposit contracts." 12 C.F.R. § 329.8 (1981).
16. 31 Fed. Reg. 16582 (1966). See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
17. American Bankers Association Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Peti-
tioner at 21, Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), argued, 50
U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 11, 1982) (Brief for Supreme Court).
18. Id. at 20.
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This Note analyzes the legislative history of the 1933 Act,19 1934
Act, 20 and the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)21 to ascertain
whether Congress may have intended to include modern instruments
such as high-yield time deposit savings certificates-items utilized
today as alternative investment vehicles to minimize the effects of
double digit inflation and interest rates. It examines the split among
the circuits which have attempted to reconcile statutory language and
congressional intent with the practicalities of the modern complex
financial marketplace in determining whether promissory notes, in-
cluding certificates of deposit, 22 are securities. This Note concludes
that Congress did not intend to cover certificates of deposit within the
scope of the securities acts. Furthermore, in view of the potential
over-regulation of the banking industry, courts should not stretch the
statutory definition of a security to afford an additional jurisdictional
means for aggrieved certificate holders to be heard before the federal
bench.
II. Securities and Banking Legislation
in the Seventy-Third Congress
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent
depression, the Seventy-third Congress enacted three statutory
schemes-the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and the Glass-Steagall Act-
designed to cure abuses within the financial marketplace. 23  The
19. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp.
III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980)).
20. 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 &
Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980)).
21. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 227
(1976)).
22. A certificate of deposit is "a note of the issuing bank which recites that an
amount of money has been deposited and will be paid by the bank to a named person
or bearer." F. BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL.BANKING LAw 85
(4th ed. 1974) (emphasis added). It ordinarily constitutes a promissory note. MIcHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING § 313 n.84 (1973 & Supp. 1981). See also Wightman v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank of Riverton, __ Wyo. -, 610 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1980) ("a certificate
of deposit is simply a commercially glamorous name for a promissory note"); Worden
v. Thornburg, 564 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) ("[a] non-negotiable
certificate of deposit represents a form of promissory note").
23. The securities acts were passed at the urging of President Roosevelt who called
for new laws requiring full publicity and disclosure of all "essentially important
element[s]" attending every issue of new securities. Letter from President Franklin
D. Roosevelt to Congress (Mar. 29, 1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
The legislation was intended to encourage "honest dealing in securities and thereby
bring back public confidence" in the investment markets and, moreover, to eliminate
the "unethical and unsafe practices of bank and corporate officers." Id.
1982]
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contemporaneous enactment of banking and securities legislation,
each of which potentially governs high-yield certificates of deposit,
raises the question of whether Congress intended the statutes to regu-
late mutually exclusive subject matter. Congress included in the 1933
and 1934 Acts, antifraud provisions,2 4 which prohibit fraudulent in-
terstate transactions in securities (section 17 of the 1933 Act)2 5 or the
use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security (section 10b of the 1934 Act) .2 Accord-
ing to a Senate report, the 1933 Act was intended to "protect the
investing public" by "informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities ...and providing protection against fraud and misrepre-
sentation. ' 27 Moreover, the drafters of the statutes sought to afford
protection "wherever there are savings accounts, wherever people
invest their funds ...in banks [and where they have] suffered be-
cause of lack of information concerning investments that have been
recommended to them. '28
During the eighteen month period in which Congress enacted the
1933 and 1934 Acts, it established a separate scheme of legislation, the
Glass-Steagall Act, 2  for the regulation of the banking industry and
24. See notes 12-14 supra.
25. See note 12 supra for text of § 17.
26. See note 13 supra for text of § 10b.
27. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
28. 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933). During the debate on H.R. 9323, (the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), Representative Studley of New York predicted that Wall
Street would move to Canada if the bill were passed. He bemoaned that "if the
Congress [passes the bill] more than a billion dollars worth of real estate south of
Fulton Street in Manhattan alone will become unproductive and tenantless. More
than a hundred thousand people in New York City would be thrown out of employ-
ment and into the bread lines." 78 CONG. REc. 7943 (1934). Although the concepts of
securities legislation were not without its detractors, most lawmakers shared the
views of Congressman Mapes, one of the statutes' drafters, who stressed the obliga-
tion to protect investors by ensuring the availability of material information about
the securities which the public was being asked to purchase. 77 CONG. REC. 2912
(1933). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized the remedial purpose of the
1933 and 1934 Acts: "The Securities Act of 1933 ... was designed to provide inves-
tors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of secur-
ities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud .... [T]he 1934 Act was
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices ......
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976). See generally Ellenberger
& Mahan, I Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959-60); Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214 (1959-60).
29. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 227 (1976)).
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the protection of depositors. 30  The statute was intended to separate
the large private banks, whose chief business was investment, from
deposit banking.3 1 Designed to supervise closely the financial activity
and stability of banks, the act created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 32 to insure deposits against loss. The statute regulated
interest payable on demand deposits and payment of interest in ac-
cordance with the terms of any certificate of deposit; 33 purchase of
investment securities; 34 prohibition of dealing in securities and accept-
ance of bank deposit by the same entity; 35 and restriction of involve-
ment by bank officers in the securities business. 36 In addition, the Act
attempted to separate banking and investment activities by prohibit-
ing member banks of the Federal Reserve System from owning or
controlling affiliated securities firms.
37
30. Representative Steagall, co-sponsor of the bill, stated that "the purpose of this
legislation is to protect the people of the United States in the right to have banks in
which their deposits will be safe." 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933). The creation of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was intended to alleviate these concerns. See
note 32 infra.
31. 77 CONG. REC. 3730 (1933). During the debate on the Senate version (S. 1631)
of the banking bill, Senator Glass declared that "[t]he main purpose of the
bill ... was to prevent, under penalty, the use of Federal Reserve banking facilities
for stock-gambling purposes." Id. at 3725. In the debate in the House of Representa-
tives, it was stated that the bill "prohibits institutions dealing in securities and
underwriting securities from accepting deposits." Id. at 3835. "[Tlhe Glass-Steagall
Act was enacted in 1933 to protect bank depositors from any repetition of the
widespread bank closings that occurred during the Great Depression." Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61 (1981).
32. 48 Stat. 168 (1933), (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976)). FDIC insurance
covers both principal and interest of bank accounts up to $100,000. 12 U.S.C. §
1813(m)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 308(b)(1), 94 Stat. 132, 147 (1980). For provisions governing time
deposits, see part 329 of the Rules and Regulations of the FDIC, 12 C.F.R. § 329.0-
.101 (1981). To qualify for federal deposit insurance, a bank must satisfy Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation standards with respect to the use of the bank's capital
structure, financial history, potential for future earnings, management and relation-
ship to the community it will serve. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976).
33. 48 Stat. 181 (1933).
34. Id. at 185. Investment securities are construed herein as "marketable obliga-
tions evidencing indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corpora-
tion in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly known as 'investment
securities' . . . as may by regulation be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency." Id. See generally Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have For
Today's Financial World?, 95 BANK L.J. 404, 404 n.1 (1978).
35. 48 Stat. 189 (1933) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)).
36. Id. at 194 (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976)).
37. Id. at 188-89 (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976)).
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III. Judicial Definition of Security and
the Treatment of Promissory Notes
Although there have been few Supreme Court decisions 3s defining
security under the "virtually identical" 9 provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, 40 the Court repeatedly has held that securities legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose. 41 In
38. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (noncon-
tributory compulsory pension plan under a collective bargaining agreement held not
to be a security); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (shares
in a "nonprofit" cooperative housing project held not to be a security); Superintend-
ent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.6 (1971) (United States
Treasury Bonds are securities); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (with-
drawable capital shares in a savings and loan association held to be securities where
amount of dividends was tied directly to profits); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1967) (life annuity contract with flexible returns which
appealed to purchaser because of its growth through investment management held to
be security); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) ("variable"
annuity contract which guaranteed periodic payments, the amount of which was not
fixed but varied according to investment policy, held to be a security); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (contracts for sale of land in citrus grove develop-
ment and for cultivating and marketing crops held to be securities); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sale of parcels of oil leases under promise
of exploration are securities).
39. "The definition of 'security' [is] substantially the same as [that] in the Secur-
ities Act of 1933." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). See also Tcherep-
nin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), where the Supreme Court characterized the two
definitions as "virtually identical." Id. at 342. Accord National Bank of Commerce v.
All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978) (definitions in 1933 and
1934 Acts functionally equivalent); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d
1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1977); Great W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1255
(9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 107 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
40. See note 7 supra for the statutory definitions of "security."
41. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). "As used in both the 1933
and .1934 Acts, security 'embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of money of others on the promise of profits."' Id. at 338, quoting
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See also Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). Similarly, in
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court
stated that in defining "security," Congress sought "[t]o define 'the term . . . in
sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many
types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of
a security."' Id. at 847-48, citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
Therefore, "[f]ederal securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds
[should] be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes."' Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972).
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SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 42 the Court articulated a test to distinguish
an investment contract or security from commercial dealings not regu-
lated by securities law: "whether the scheme involves [1] an invest-
ment of money in [2] a common enterprise [3] with profits [4] to
come solely from the efforts of others." 43 Repeating the test in United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,44 the Court added, "[t]he
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."' 45
The circuit courts have differed 46 over the implementation of the
Howey and Forman rules and have developed three approaches to
determine whether a promissory note falls under the statutory defini-
tion of security. 47 Although the application of one approach rather
than another does not necessarily lead to different results, 48 the three
views emphasize different factors in the Supreme Court formulations
and reflect competing policies within the securities acts. Given the
close relationship of certificates of deposit to promissory notes, 4 courts
have used one of these three approaches in assessing whether such
notes are securities.5 0
42. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
43. Id. at 301.
44. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
45. Id. at 852.
46. In a recent Fifth Circuit case, the court cited Judge Friendly's criticism in
Exchange National Bank that the Howey test cannot be applied universally and is of
"dubious value" when a court must decide whether a note is a security. Meason v.
Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542, 550 n.17 (5th Cir. 1981), citing Exchange Nat'l Bank
of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
Sprague v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 79-1374 (D. Mass. Jan. 21, 1982) (holding that
certain notes were securities, the court stated that it "is not bound by any of the
[three tests] because this Circuit has yet to adopt a particular approach"); SEC v.
Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 108-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (to determine
whether a purchase money mortgage issued by a corporation to a trust is a security,
the court examined the approaches taken by the different circuits because the courts
of appeal "unfortunately" had devised different tests to determine whether a note
constitutes a security).
47. See notes 55-94 infra and accompanying text.
48. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 431
(9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (W.D. Tenn.
1980).
49. See notes 6 and 22 supra.
50. See notes 55-94 infra and accompanying text. See generally Hannan &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Secur-
ities, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 219 (1974); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Secur-
ities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1974-75); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of
Note Transaction: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1980); Comment,
Commercial Notes and Definition of a "Security" Under the Securities and Exchange
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The Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth circuits, following the "com-
mercial-investment dichotomy"51 approach, hold that the transaction
involving a note must be of an "investment" rather than of a "com-
mercial" nature for the note to be a security. By contrast, the "risk-
capital" 52 test followed by the Ninth Circuit examines whether the
lender contributes risk capital, the return of which depends on the
managerial skills and efforts of the borrower. Finally, the "literal"
view5 3 of the Second Circuit applies a strict reading of the statutory
definitions and treats "any note" as a security "unless the context
otherwise requires." 
5 4
A. Commercial-Investment Dichotomy Approach
Those circuits which apply the commercial-investment dichotomy
evaluate the context of the underlying transaction in which the note is
issued to determine whether the note is a security.55 As one court
Act oj 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973); Annot., 39
A.L.R. FED. 357 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
51. See notes 55-72 infra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 73-80 infra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 81-94 infra and accompanying text.
54. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137
(2d Cir. 1976)..
55. First Nat'l Bank of Las Vegas, N.M. v. Estate of Russel, 657 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.
1981) (defendant claimed that a sale and repurchase agreement involving Treasury
notes was not a purchase or sale of a security according to the commercial-investment
dichotomy analysis; the court withheld judgment, holding that summary judgment
in favor of the defendant was improper); American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S.
Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1980) (loan participation was conducted
in a commercial context not a security); United Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620
F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980) (loan participation interest deemed mere promissory note
issued in context of a commercial transaction); National Bank of Commerce of Dallas
v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978) (loan evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a pledge of securities not a security); McGovern
Plaza Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977)
(loan commitments used to finance a hotel construction not of an investment nature);
C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G & G Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975) (promis-
sory notes delivered to bank for loans used to purchase the assets of a business deemed
ordinary commercial paper, not securities); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1974) (notes given to an unsophisticated investor for promotion of a corporation
were securities); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974) (one of two factors indicate a transaction of investment nature: (1) the notes
were either for speculation or investment, or (2) the notes were exchanged to obtain
investment assets directly or indirectly); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (notes issued by a broker as partial reimbursement for
losses to customers sustained in connection with discretionary trading were held to be
securities since the context of their issuance was commercial); Bellah v. First Nat'l
Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974) (six-month promissory note renew-
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explained, the test arose because securities laws "evinced the concern
of Congress about practices associated with investment transactions,
and . . . [because] the securities laws were not designed to regulate
commercial transactions." 56  One commentator has noted that the
commercial-investment approach has considerable flexibility as it ex-
cludes commercial transactions that do not qualify for the protection
of securities law, yet provides protection where notes are issued in an
investment context. 57
In Zabriskie v. Lewis,5 8 a real estate agent and a broker promised
the plaintiff 59 a return of 120 percent on money she loaned a third
party to promote a new corporation, and she was given a promissory
note in exchange.6 0  When the short term notes became due, the
plaintiff's attempts to recover her funds were unsuccessful.6 1 Faced
with the issue of whether the promissory notes made by the third party
were securities under the 1934 Act,6 2 the court summarized the ration-
ale of the commercial investment approach:
This test is based on the purpose of the Act to protect investors, the
"unless the context otherwise requires" language, and the practical
considerations of subjecting commercial notes to the registration
provisions of the Securities Act as well as fear of the resulting
litigation flooding the federal courts if commercial notes were in-
cluded. 63
The plaintiff initially approached the defendant for the purpose of
securing an investment for her.6 4 In addition, one defendant empha-
sized that the plaintiff's funds were to be used to promote "'one of the
ing prior bank loans issued to finance a livestock business held to be of a "commer-
cial" rather than an "investment" nature); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689
(3d Cir. 1973) (transaction in which plaintiff gave cash and notes for two franchise
license agreements held to be of a commercial context); Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Waugneux, 484 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (reinsurance agreement held not an
investment transaction).
56. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 431 n.6
(9th Cir. 1978) (applying risk capital test).
57. Lipton & Katz, Notes Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763, 770
(1975).
58. 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
59. The court characterized the investor as "unsophisticated." Zabriskie, 507 F.2d
at 551.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 549.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 551. See note 83 inJra for a discussion of the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language.
64. 507 F.2d at 551.
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greatest stock developments he had ever heard of.... .. ,5 In view
of these findings, the court held that the transaction took place in an
investment context. 6
Utilizing the same approach, the Third Circuit reached a different
result in a decision involving franchise license agreements. In Lino v.
City Investing Co., 7 two such agreements were purchased from the
defendant's subsidiary for cash and promissory notes.6 8  The court
characterized the transaction as "commercial," noting that it involved
promissory notes issued by a private party. Under the terms of the
agreements, the plaintiff was to open and staff a sales center, recruit
and train distributors, and devote his full time and "best efforts" to
the business.6 9  The court noted that the Howey test examined
whether a transaction involved profits coming "'solely from the efforts
of [others] ...... ' 70 Rejecting a literal application of "solely" in
order to carry out the remedial purpose of securities legislation, the
court observed that the plaintiff's efforts in the enterprise were "not
[to be] nominal or insignificant" 71 under the terms of the agreements.
Thus, the court concluded that the notes were not securities under the
acts. 7
2
B. Risk Capital Test
The "risk capital" approach taken by the Ninth Circuit analyzes the
risk accompanying the transaction to the party providing the funds or
risk capital. 73  The test applies the Howey rule by assessing whether
65. Id. at 548.
66. Id. at 551-52. See also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
When a prospective borrower approaches a bank for a loan and gives his
note in consideration for it, the bank has purchased commercial paper.
But a person who seeks to invest his money and receives a note in return
for it has not purchased commercial paper in the usual sense. He has
purchased a security investment.
67. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 690.
69. Id. at 693-94.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Id. at 693.
72. Id. at 696.
73. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1978) (construction loan made to finance a shopping center not "risk capital");
United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977) (put letter
agreement and notes not a security); Great W. Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (note issued in commercial finance transaction with a bank not a
security); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974) (transac-
tion involving note issued for money used to purchase mutual funds which were
[Vol. X482
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an investor commits "assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to
subject himself to financial loss."' 74 Thus, in Great Western Bank and
Trust v. Kotz, 75 the court examined whether the lender had contrib-
uted funds subject to the entrepreneurial efforts of others. 76 In Kotz,
the plaintiff bank failed to receive payment of an unsecured note
which signified a line of credit for commercial loans whose proceeds
were to be used for the borrower's working capital.77 Alleging that
material misrepresentations were made in the course of the transac-
tion, the bank argued that the note was a security under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Examining the commercial-investment test adopted by
other circuits, the Kotz court shifted the analysis to an examination of
risk, reasoning that the distinction between investment and commer-
cial transactions was less meaningful in the banking context. 7  The
pledged as collateral for the loan held not to involve risk capital). The risk capital
approach has recently been adopted by the Sixth Circuit to determine if the "pres-
ence of an investment" exists for the purpose of applying the Howey-Forman test. See
text accompanying note 42 supra, Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Com-
mercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981) (loan participa-
tion agreement not risk capital). See also State of Ohio v. Crofters, 525 F. Supp.
1133, 1138 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
The test originated in California state court in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The issue in that
case was whether a country club promotion financing plan entailed the sale of
securities under state securities law. Id. at __, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
Promoters planned to finance a country club operation by the sale of non-equity
memberships which they claimed were not investments. The plaintiffs claimed the
club memberships fell within the statutory language, "beneficial interest or title to
property, profits, or earnings," included in the definition of security. The court
recognized that a member's contractual right to use club facilities did come within
the language of the statute. However, in finding the promotional memberships to be
"securities," the court relied on the fact that the capital solicited to finance the
venture for profit was put at risk; that is, "only because [a purchaser] risks his capital
along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the benefits of club
memberships will materialize." Id. See Carney & Fraser, Defining a Security:
Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMOHY L.J. 73, 91 (1981). This
was pursuant to a state corporation code. 55 Cal. 2d at __, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal.
Rptr. at 187. As formulated in Silver Hills, the objective of the "risk capital" ap-
proach was "to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing
their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their
capital in one form or another." Id. at -, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-
89.
74. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
75. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
76. See also Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426
(9th Cir. 1978); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977);
El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974).
77. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1254-55.
78. Id. at 1257. The court, therefore, distinguished "risky" loans made in a
commercial context from notes evidencing "risk capital," using six factors to deter-
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court determined that the return of the loan amount did not depend
upon the efforts of the borrower whose use of the funds was restricted
in the loan agreement.79 It concluded, therefore, that "[a] note given
to a bank in the course of a commercial financing transaction was not
generally a security within the meaning of the Federal securities
acts."80
C. The Literal View
Expressly rejecting the risk capital and commercial-investment ap-
proaches, the Second Circuit 8' has adopted a third view which focuses
on the literal wording of the acts. Under this view, if a note falls
within the plain terms of both acts,8 2 it is a security and the party
asserting the nonapplicability of the acts has the burden of proving
mine whether the lender contributed risk capital: time, collaterization, form of the
obligation, circumstances of issuance, the relationship between the amount borrowed
and the size of the borrowers' business, and the use of the proceeds. Id. at 1257-58.
See also Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448, 452 n.8
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
In State of Ohio v. Crofters, 525 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the court
applied the risk capital test to determine if promissory notes which became uncollect-
ible (lue to the issuer's bankruptcy were securities. The court found that:
the transactions involved "risk capital" because the notes were not payable
for two years, were not secured with collateral, placed no restrictions on
use of the loan proceeds or the financial operations of [the borrower], and
reflected an amount borrowed that appeared to be relatively large in
relation to [the borrower's] business thereby indicating the taking of a
substantial risk in [the borrower's] enterprise.
Id. at 1138.
79. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1259.
80. Id. at 1260.
81. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d
Cir. 1976). See also Aldrich v. New York Stock Exch., 446 F. Supp. 348, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court recited literal view test but did not reach the question due to
failure of plaintiff to allege adequately the existence of a "purchase or sale" of
securities under the Act); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial
Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (loan participation agreement was a
"security" even though the underlying loan was held not to be). Although the Second
Circuit's approach has been rejected by most courts, see note 94 infra, the District
Court for the District of Columbia commented that "the Second Circuit's approach is
most consistent with the language of the statute and Congressional intent and is by
far the easiest test to apply." SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 108-
10 (D.C. 1979) (court undertook to analyze issue under all three approaches without
expressing preference for any one test). Recent decisions of district courts located in
the Second Circuit have not followed the literal view. See, e.g., Tanuggi v. Grolier,
Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (examining Forman factors); Ayala v.
Jamaica Sav. Bank, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,041 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
82. See note 7 supra for text of the definitional sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
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that the "context otherwise requires."8 3 An early decision to suggest
this approach was Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc. ,84 where the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York exam-
ined whether promissory notes payable in installments for the pur-
chase of business assets were securities. 85 The court found no ambigu-
ity in the statutory definition of security and noted that "a literal
reading of the language [did not] defeat or hamper Congress' appar-
ent purpose. ' 86 As a result, it held the promissory notes to be secur-
ities. 87
Relying in part on the Movielab rationale, the Second Circuit, in
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.,88 advised
"greater recourse to the statutory language."89 In Exchange National
Bank, a bank acted in reliance on accountants' financial statements
and purchased notes that became worthless. The court rejected the
defendant accountants' argument that no note given to evidence a
bank loan could be a security by taking recourse to the literal language
of the statute.90 The court reasoned that "[e]xcept for the . . . lan-
83. Exchange National Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137-38. This Second Circuit test fo-
cuses on the prefatory language to the statutory definition sections which begin,
"when used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires .... § 2 of 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); § 3 of 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), quoted in
Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d at 1131. In
addition, the court gave examples of transactions in which a note would not be a
security including: "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets .... Id. at 1138. See also The Fund of Funds, Ltd., v. Vesco,
Fmo. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the court applied the Exchange
National Bank holding and found that a promissory note given in a forced loan
transaction between parent and subsidiary was a security).
84. 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afJ'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
85. Id. at 807. The plaintiff promisor failed to make timely payment. When the
defendant accelerated the payment schedule, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had made false representations and concealed certain material facts, Id. at 808.
86. Id. at 809.
Try as we may, we fail to detect in the 1934 Act any grant of discretionary
power to the court to construe the term "security" as including certain
types of notes but not others. Congress apparently decided that it would
pass a sweeping prohibition rather than attempt to draw such distinctions.
We are bound by that decision.
Id.
87. Id. On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court had lacked subject
matter jurisdiction; they conceded, however, that the statutory definition of "secur-
ity" included "any note," and the court rejected their argument with no further
analysis that "[if t]he term 'security' means any note ... [it] therefore includes some
notes at the very least." 452 F.2d at 663.
88. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 1137.
90. Id.
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guage ['unless the context otherwise requires'], the terms of the 1933
Act would . . .have the result of subjecting to the anti-fraud provi-
sions, in contrast to the registration requirements, any note, however
short the term and however far the transaction was from being an
investment security." 91  A closer reading of statutory language, the
court reasoned, would result in a test easier9 2 to apply than the
cornmercial-investment dichotomy' or the risk capital test.
94
91. Id. at 1132. See also Banco Nacional de Costa Rica v. Bremar Holdings Corp.,
492 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court said that for a promissory note to
be a security, it must bear "a strong family resemblance" to the examples given by the
court in Exchange National Bank, see note 83 supra. But see Altman v. Knight, 431
F. Supp. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (promissory note given in a business acquisition
not a security because "the context otherwise required"). In justifying its reading of
the statute, the Exchange National Bank court stated that application of the "unless
context otherwise requires" language would not violate the Supreme Court's "anti-
literalist" stance. In Forman, the Supreme Court had stated:
Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress in-
tended the application of [the securities acts] to turn on the economic
realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.
Thus, in construing [the securities acts] against the background of their
purpose, we. are guided by a traditional canon of statutory construction:
"[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers."
421 U.S. at 849, quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892). Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981), however, describes Exchange National Bank as
representing "a new literalism." Id. at 1180 n.7. Other courts also have severely
criticized the Second Circuit approach. See note 93 infra.
92. Exchange National Bank, 544 F.2d at 1138.
93. Though it emphasized the investment nature of the instrument, see text ac-
companying note 91 supra, the Second Circuit criticized the "commercial-invest-
ment" dichotomy as being too hard to implement: "'the polarized extremes [in the
dichotomy] are conceptually identifiable .... In between is a gray area which, in
the absence of further congressional indication of intent or Supreme Court construc-
tion, has been and must be ...subjected to case-by-case treatment."' Id. at 1135,
quoting C.N.S. Enters. Inc. v. G & G Enters. Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Cf. SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp.
104, 110 (D.D.C. 1979) (the court discussed the three approaches and endorsed the
literal view as the easiest to apply).
94. Exchange National Bank, 544 F.2d at 1136-37. "Directing district courts to
'weigh' a number of . . .dubious factors, without any instructions as to relative
weights ...is scarcely helpful .... " Id. at 1137. The Fifth Circuit has often stated
that "although the 1934 Act defines 'security' as including 'any' note, judicial deci-
sions have restricted the application of the Act to those notes that are investment in
nature and have excluded notes which are only reflective of individual commercial
transactions."' First Nat'l Bank of Las Vegas, N.M. v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d
668, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1981), quoting McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 497
F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1974), See also United Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620
F.2d 1108, 1114 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[a]lthough the definitional sections of the Ex-
change Act and Securities Act literally apply to 'any note,' a literal application of
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IV. Should Certificates of Deposit Be Considered Securities?
A. An Application of the Promissory Note Tests
The certificate of deposit issued by a bank in exchange for currency
should not qualify under any of the three approaches used to deter-
mine the nature of a promissory note. Under the commercial-invest-
ment test, savings certificates fall within the commercial realm: 5 a
depositor purchases a note promising return of capital plus fixed
interest over a stated period. This transaction can best be viewed as
mercantile in nature, an exchange between a consumer (depositor)
and a merchant (banker) .1 The certificate holder merely purchases a
promissory note-not investment assets, a share in a speculative in-
vestment, or an interest in a business venture.9 7
Similarly, a certificate of deposit would not qualify as a security
under the Ninth Circuit risk capital test. 8 A time depositor faces
little risk of not receiving the stated interest promised by the issuer of
the certificate for two reasons. First, a certificate holder contributes
funds to a bank or savings and loan association in exchange for a
simple pledge to pay fixed interest payments 9 and repayment of
these statutes was rejected by the Supreme Court."); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of
Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974); LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC
Gov't See., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 828 ("It is well established that in determining
whether a financial instrument is a 'security,' the court is not to take the 'literal
approach' but is to look to the economic realities underlying the transaction"). The
Third Circuit has held that the statutory definition of a security cannot be read
literally and in context, a "note" may be outside the statute. Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973). Indeed, recently a United States District Court
within the Second District rejected the literal approach and stated "that Congress
never intended to regulate the time deposits hereunder [examined] through the
securities laws." Ayala v. Jamaica Sav. Bank, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,041
(E.D.N.Y. 1981). As one treatise on statutory construction states:
The policy that a remedial statute should be liberally construed in order
to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted is firmly
established . . . [but] [t]he rule of liberal construction will not override
other rules where its application would defeat the intention of the legisla-
ture or the evident meaning of an act.
3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 29 (4th ed. 1974).
95. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
96. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
97. See generally Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and
Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Lipton & Katz,
"Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1974-75); Comment, Bank
Loan Participations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts, and the Commercial/
Investment Dichotomy, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 261 (1977).
98. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
99. The concept of fixed return has been considered important in determining
whether an instrument is a security. See Ayala v. Jamaica Sav. Bank, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,041, at 91,376 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). The court stated that
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capital. The entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of the promisor ' 00
have little bearing on the promisee's return on his investment. Second,
even in the event of bank failure, the time deposit is insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.' 10
Finally, although the literal view 10 2 arguably is simple in applica-
tion, 10 3 it may afford the greatest risk of misconstruing legislative
intent by failing to consider the activities of the Seventy-third Con-
gress when it enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the Glass-Steagall
Act. 0 4  This view assumes that any note is a security unless it is
proved that the context requires a different construction. 0 s Applica-
tion of this approach would afford an avenue of action against alleged
perpetrators of fraud by providing federal jurisdiction for any plain-
tiff who alleges a failure to make full disclosure concerning a transac-
tion involving a note. Given the widespread issuance of savings certifi-
cates, 10 there would be a flood of litigation in the federal courts
should the literal approach be applied universally. 107
The Securities and Exchange Commission has long taken the posi-
tion that a debt interest such as a certificate of deposit for cash is a
security under the federal securities laws, urging that "solicitation of
investors' funds [is] not significantly different from any corporate
enterprise seeking debt financing." 108  The American Law Institute,
an examination of the time deposits issued by [defendant] reveals that they
are substantially identical to savings accounts-the investment is based on
a contract which provides for a fixed rate of interest, the interest payable
to depositors is unrelated to the earnings of the bank, and the amount
payable to depositors is federally insured. These salient features . . . [were
factors in persuading] us that the term "security" ... does not include the
time deposits hereunder examination.
Id. at 91,379 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text for the Forman test.
101. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
102. See notes 81-94 supra and accompanying text.
103. SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 110 (D.D.C. 1979) (where
the court endorsed the literal view as the easiest to apply).
104. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 7 supra for text of statutory definition of "security" in the securities
acts.
106. See note 4 supra.
107. See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974), where the
court expressed its concern for "the resulting litigation flooding the federal courts if
commercial notes were included [within the statutory definition of security]."
108. Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (Feb. 23, 1982) (citing SEC amicus curiae memorandum). Mac-
Kethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 439 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (E.D. Va. 1977),
referring to the SEC brief in Burrus, Cootes, & Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262
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by contrast, specifically excludes either an interest in a deposit ac-
count with a bank or a bank certificate of deposit that ranks on parity
with an interest in a deposit account with the bank from the definition
of "security" in its proposed Federal Securities Code. 09
The few courts that have examined whether a high-yield certificate
of deposit is a security either have hesitated to rule squarely" 0 on the
issue or have given only a cursory analysis to an issue which requires a
decisive answer. In Weaver,11' for example, the Third Circuit failed
to rule on the status of the certificate of deposit," 2 noting only that
summary judgment was granted inappropriately. It suggested, how-
ever, that certificates of deposit were the "functional equivalent" of
(4th Cir. 1976); Weaver, 637 F.2d at 164 n.8. See also Letter from Stanley B. Judd,
Assistant Chief Counsel, SEC, to Carl L. Shipley, General Counsel, Steadman
Security Corp., (Nov. 18, 1978). The SEC has referred to a certificate of deposit as a
security in its releases. See, e.g., SEC Release No. 9143 (April 12, 1971); SEC Release
No. 5739 (Sept. 7, 1976). In 1966, the Commission expressed the opinion that
"deposit and share accounts are subject to the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." 31 Fed. Reg. 16581-82 (1966).
Thirteen years later, the SEC maintained its position that certificates of deposit
should be treated as securities within the meaning of the 1933 Act. Letter from
Richard K. Wulff, Attorney Advisor of the Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to
David T. Walker, Assistant General Counsel, First Pennsylvania Corp. (May 10,
1979). The letter was sent in response to an inquiry by the First Pennsylvania Corp.
which requested an interpretation of the definition of "security" with respect to
certificates of deposit issued by a subsidiary bank operating in Colorado. SEC inter-
pretations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts have been determined to hold considerable
weight. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977); United
States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
109. I ALl Fed. Sec. Code §202(150)(B)(v) (1980), quoted in Weaver v. Marine
Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, J., dissenting). The Code is the
product of more than eleven years of work and has received the endorsement of both
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Bar Association. The
Code consolidates an area referred to generally as securities law. It currently is
governed by several statutes which the Code will supercede if enacted. See Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1976 & Supp. II
1978 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally Note, The Proposed Federal Securities Code:
Time To Recognize That Financial Information Becomes Stale, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
719 (1981).
110. In SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), the
court held that certificates of investment and passbook savings accounts in a bank
were securities within the scope of the 1933 Act. Id. at 678. That case involved a suit
by the SEC against an institution which misrepresented that it had deposit insurance.
111. 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), argued, 50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 11, 1982). See
notes 9, 10 supra and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 164-65.
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withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan association,11 3 in-
struments which the Supreme Court had deemed securities in
Tcherepnin v. Knight."4 The Seventh Circuit has upheld a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a plaintiff failed to allege
the four factors of the Howey-Forman test for an investment. 1 5 In
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland,"6 the
plaintiff sought federal jurisdiction to bring a securities action involv-
ing a certificate of deposit of a banking and trust company. Although
it ruled on jurisdictional grounds, the court suggested in dictum that it
might have been predisposed to rule that a certificate of deposit is not
a security had the pleadings been sufficient." 7
I Unlike the Third and Seventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit has ruled
squarely that a certificate of deposit is not a security.' 8  In Burrus,
Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan,"9 the receiver of a savings and loan
corporation claimed that a certified public accounting firm acted
fraudulently in connection with certificates issued to depositors of the
bank. The court based its decision 2 0 on a Fifth Circuit ruling, Bellah
v. First National Bank of Hereford,'2' where the court held that "a
certificate of deposit issued in exchange for currency is not encom-
passed within" the statutory definition of security in the 1934 Act. 2 2
Ironically, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions can be traced to a
Second Circuit case decided before Exchange National Bank which
failed even to reach the issue of whether a certificate of deposit was a
security. 23
113. Id. at 164.
114. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). This comparison is erroneous. Tcherepnin involved
instruments which were capital in nature, had voting rights, were transferable and
entitled to dividends based on profits. By contrast, time depositors such as the
plaintiffs in Weaver possess a certificate merely acknowledging their non-equity
deposit and obligation of the issuer to repay the principal at a fixed rate regardless of
the issuing bank's profitability.
115. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465,
468-70 (7th Cir. 1980).
116. 615 F.2d 465.
117. Id. at 469-70. In dictum, the court cited Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of
Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974), and two lower court rulings which held
that a certificate of deposit is not a security. The court was, however, "cautious not
to say that any document called a certificate of deposit cannot be a security." Id. at
470.
118. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262, 1265 (4th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
119. Id.
120. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus, 537 F.2d at 1264.
121. 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. Id. at 1114.
123. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S.
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B. A Suggested Approach
In their efforts to construe the statutory definitions, the courts have
not analyzed sufficiently the context 24 in which the Seventy-third
Congress drafted the securities acts and the Glass-Steagall Act. The
drafters of these statutes, designed to cure abuses in investment activi-
ties, could not have predicted in 1933 the widespread public accept-
ance of time deposits as investments-a phenomenon which would
arise some forty-five years later.1 25 A broad construction of the secur-
ities acts would include today's high-yield certificate of deposit under
a theory that these instruments have become a substitute for long-term
securities. Proponents of this view have argued that the obligation of
the depository bank to pay a fixed return is similar to bonds, deben-
tures or other investments yielding fixed returns that are governed by
the securities acts. 26  Three arguments, however, militate against
inclusion of high-yield certificates of deposit in securities laws: the
contemporaneous enactment of banking and securities laws; 127 the
existence of specific banking regulations; and the likelihood of over-
regulation of the banking industry.
First, in order to curtail speculative investment activity that endan-
gered both the savings and investment capital of the public, the
Seventy-third Congress drafted three pieces of remedial legislation de-
signed to operate in mutually exclusive areas. The Glass-Steagall Act
separated the banking and investment industries,12 specifically regu-
lated interest payable on time deposits,129 and insured bank deposits
against loss. 130  The securities acts, by contrast, conferred considera-
ble protection to investors through antifraud provisions giving them
6 (1971). The court did "not reach the novel and difficult question of whether
certificates of deposit [which are issued for cash and are pieces of paper evidencing
the existence of a time deposit] fall within the statutory definition of the term
'security."' 300 F. Supp. at 1099.
124. "What the words of a statute say and what they mean are often entirely
different. The former is the literal meaning, the latter is the contextual meaning." de
Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q.REv. 538 (1934), re-
printed in 3 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 503 (4th ed. 1974).
125. See notes 2, 3 supra.
126. See, e.g., Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1980), argued,
50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 11, 1982). "Here ... [the] Bank's obligation is to pay a sum
certain and a fixed interest return. It is in form and in fact a long term debt
obligation."
127. "[W]hen it is necessary to resort to the process of construction the court may
properly refer to certain other statutes in its effort to determine the meaning of the
language used by the legislature, especially where such statutes are preexisting or
contemporaneous." CRAwFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 428 (1940).
128. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
130. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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access to material information for those instruments that qualified as
securities.'' The drafters, however, excluded bank deposits and
other similar terminology from the extensive list of types of securities
contained in the statutory definitions. 3 2  In light of references to
these instruments in pre-existing 133 and contemporaneous legisla-
tion, 3 4 this omission suggests that the Seventy-third Congress did not
intend to place time deposit savings certificates within the jurisdiction
of the securities acts.
Second, although certificates of deposit arguably fall within the
meaning of security, courts should not permit certificate holders to
gain jurisdiction135 under the 1933 and 1934 Acts 36 because banking
regulations provide adequate remedies. 3 7  The Supreme Court has
held that the existence of a specific regulatory scheme may preclude
inclusion of such an instrument in other legislation. In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,138 the Court faced the issue of
whether pension plans were securities under the securities acts. Al-
though the Court noted that pension plans were neither included nor
excluded from the statutory definition of security,13 it emphasized
that the existence of a federal regulatory scheme 40 specifically de-
131. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 7 supra and accompanying text for statutory definitions.
133. Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act granted commercial banks the author-
ity to offer certificates of deposit to its customers. 38 Stat. 270 (Dec. 23, 1913).
134. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
135. In Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir.
1974), the court stated,
[T]he Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 create
for participants in note transactions a broad but nevertheless not boundless
federal forum for vindicating their grievances. We doubt that Congress
intended by these Acts to render federal judges the guardians of all be-
guiled makers or payees.
136. While the Banking Act of 1933 guaranteed bank deposits against loss, "[t]he
Securities Act of 1933 was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of
material information concerning public offerings of securities [and] to protect inves-
tors against fraud . . . [t]he 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices .... Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 195 (1976) (citations omitted). The securities acts, therefore, set out to make the
inherent risk of investing in securities an informed one; the Glass-Steagall Act,
however, was designed to eliminate any risks associated with depositing funds in a
bank. "The passage of [banking legislation in the 1930's] suggest[s], if anything, that
Congress was reaffirming its view that national banks should be regulated separately
by specific legislation applying only to them." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 157 (1976).
137. See notes 143-47 infra and accompanying text.
138. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
139. Id. at 558.
1,10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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signed to govern pension plans "severely undercuts all arguments for
extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension
plans." 14' Daniel, therefore, suggests that certificates which ac-
knowledge bank time deposits should not fall under the securities laws
because bank deposits are governed by separate statutes.
Third, application of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
to bank certificates of deposit would present a significant burden to an
industry already subject to comprehensive regulation.142  Existing
controls over the operations of banks satisfy the need to protect time
depositors against fraudulent bank practice and the possibility of loss
of principal and interest. Both the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have promulgated regulations
prohibiting misrepresentation in the advertisement of bank deposit
contracts. 4 3  In addition, the Federal Reserve Board and Federal
Home Loan Bank Board currently possess express statutory authority
141. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70. Accord Salazar v. Sandia Corp., 656 F.2d 578,
582 (10th Cir. 1981); Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 650 (6th Cir.
1981). "In spite of the substantial use of employee pension plans at the time they were
enacted, neither § 2(1) of the Securities Act nor § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange
Act, which define the term 'security' in considerable detail and with numerous
examples, refers to pension plans of any type." Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558. The court
added "not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported
by the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA [Employment
Retirement Income Security Act] it serves no general purpose." Id. at 570. Cf. Ayala
v. Jamaica Sav. Bank, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,041 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
The existence of ... comprehensive protective legislation over banking
practices enacted at the time of the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
considered in the light of the proliferation of banking regulations since
that time, militates against our finding that the time deposits issued [by
the defendant] are securities. The existence of a comprehensive scheme of
regulation over banking practices does not, by itself, provide an answer to
the question of whether a time deposit is a security. However, it should be
accounted for in determining whether "the context otherwise requires."
142. [T]he regulation of banking may be more intensive than the regulation
of any other industry, and it is the oldest system of economic regula-
tion .... The regulation extends to all major steps in the establishment
and development of a national bank, including not only entry into the
business, changes in status, consolidations, reorganizations, but also the
most intensive supervision of operations through regular examination of
banks.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4.04, at 247 (1958).
143. Advertisement, announcements, and solicitations relating to interest or divi-
dends paid on "deposits," which include time certificates of deposit, may not be
inaccurate, misleading, or misrepresent the deposit contract. 12 C.F.R. §§ 329.1(b),
(c), 329.8(f) (1981). Advertisements and solicitations relating to interest must be
stated in terms of annual rates of simple interest. Id. § 329.8(a). If an advertised rate
is payable only on deposits meeting time or amount requirements, the requirements
must be clearly and conspicuously stated. Id. § 329.8(d).
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to protect bank depositors against any "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" that may be committed by federally regulated banks. 144
Moreover, the banking agencies are authorized "to take appropriate
action upon complaints with respect to acts or practices by banks." 145
The FDIC also has the power to order insured state nonmember banks
to cease and desist unsafe or unsound banking practices on the viola-
tion of any rule or regulation of the agency.1 46  In addition to this
exhaustive federal regulatory apparatus, commercial banks and sav-
ings and loan associations may be subject to comprehensive state
banking laws. 47 Indeed, inclusion of high-yield certificates of de-
posit may frustrate, rather than implement, congressional intent. As
the Supreme Court observed in Forman, "[t]he primary purpose of
the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market." 148
V. Conclusion
The federal securities laws were not drafted in a vacuum. In fact,
the Seventy-third Congress enacted two remedial regulatory schemes
desiring to keep the securities and banking industries separate from
each other. The inclusion of a bank certificate of deposit within the
scope of the federal securities laws would violate congressional in-
tent. 49  Moreover, "[t]o treat a certificate of deposit as a security
would superimpose on already existing federal and state banking regu-
latory schemes a second pattern of regulations by the Securities and
Exchange Commission with the attendant risks of inter-agency con-
flict 5 0 and of the SEC's want of specialized relevant expertise in this
area of banking."' 5's  The classification of certificates of deposit as
144. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
145. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 227.2 (1981).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The FDIC also may conduct special
examinations of its insured banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (a) (Supp. IV 1980).
147. See, e.g., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 13.1-13.6 (Depositor Savings Informa-
tion); 20.1-20.6 (Payment of Interest on Commercial Bank Deposits); 64.1-64.10
(Time Deposits in Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations) (1980).
148. 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (emphasis added).
149. Congress desired to remove from the scope of the securities laws those "types
of securities and securities transactions where there is no practical need for [the
securities acts'] application or where the public benefits are too remote." H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
150. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
151. Burrus, Cootes & Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262, 1265 (4th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
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securities is not only unnecessary in the face of existing banking regu-
lations, but it also would burden both the banking industry and the
federal court calendar.
Mitchell S. Berkey
After this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 50 U.S.L. W. 4285 (Mar. 8, 1982). In a unanimous
opinion, the Court held that the certificate of deposit at issue did not
fall within the statutory definition of "'security" because "the holders
of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the
federal banking laws." Id. at 4287. It would appear that the Court
resolved the issue of whether a typical certificate of deposit constitutes
a security for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. The Court, however, cautioned that
[ift does not follow that a certificate of deposit between transacting
parties invariably falls 6utside the definition of a security. . ..
Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of
the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to
be served, and the factual setting as a whole.
Id. at 4288 n.11.
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